Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami (Labor) argues that “The idea that it’s possible to isolate Hamas, to deprive it of its right to govern, to hold a dialogue solely with the ‘moderates’ and to expect that Hamas will accept all agreements and not use its destructive power to torpedo them is unrealistic…
“The attempt to crush political Islam, as [Egyptian] President Mubarak is trying to do via the ban he recently imposed on activity by parties with a religious character, will only increase the anger of the masses, and eventually lead the fundamentalist parties back to terror and communal activism…
“A dialogue with political Islam, in the form of Hamas, for instance, is an unavoidable necessity.”
It’s not surprising that the Mecca agreement and the Palestinian unity government that arose in its wake are thorns in Israel’s side. For some time now, useless last-ditch battles have been a hallmark of Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue. But erosion of the boycott of the Palestinian unity government, perhaps the most popular government on the Palestinian street since 1993, has become evident in many Western capitals. The idea that it’s possible to isolate Hamas, to deprive it of its right to govern, to hold a dialogue solely with the “moderates” and to expect that Hamas will accept all agreements and not use its destructive power to torpedo them is unrealistic. Paradoxically, Israel and Hamas share more common ground than is apparent at first glance. The chance of a final status agreement emerging from a direct dialogue with the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mahmoud Abbas, is close to nil. When this becomes clear, and Israel starts searching for a way to return to the idea of withdrawal from the West Bank, it probably won’t find a worthier partner than Hamas. Hamas, like Israel, is not ready for the compromises entailed by a final status accord. But a long-term interim agreement is possible only with it, and not with the PLO.
Hamas’ transition to parliamentary politics is part of a process many movements from the mainstream of fundamentalist Islam are undergoing today, as they seek to disassociate themselves from global jihad founded by Al-Qaida, and instead seek to integrate themselves in their country’s political fabric. In Egypt, this is the direction being taken by the Muslim Brotherhood, and it is also that of Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, of the Renaissance Party in Tunisia and of the Justice and Development Party in Morocco.
The United States is winning the war for Arab democracy, but paradoxically, it is declining to reap the rewards because the new image of Islamic political pluralism does not match the illusion of liberal democracy in whose name America sought to change the face of the Middle East. The West, Israel included, and the Arab rulers it has cultivated need to understand that the struggle between political Islam and the conservative regimes needn’t be a zero-sum game. The Mecca agreement is not a marginal matter; it is no random, passing event. This was a formative move in the shaping of a new and revolutionary pattern of a division of power between political Islam and the secular regimes in the Arab world. Hamas certainly won’t be satisfied with seats in a government under occupation. Its objective is to conquer the PLO from within and to create a different balance between itself and the powers of Palestinian secular nationalism.
This could be the approach in other places, too. In Morocco, Mohammed VI made it clear that he intends to forge “a historic compromise” with political Islam, given the possibility that the Justice and Development Party will be victorious in the country’s June elections. The model of national unity that was born in Mecca has become the barrier that is preventing a civil war in the Palestinian Authority. In Algeria, by comparison, the February 2006 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation was formulated as a tool for ending a bloody civil war which was sparked when the Islamist parties were denied the right to realize their victory in the 1991 elections.
The attempt to crush political Islam, as President Mubarak is trying to do via the ban he recently imposed on activity by parties with a religious character, will only increase the anger of the masses, and eventually lead the fundamentalist parties back to terror and communal activism. The stability of Arab regimes that do not rely on a democratic consensus is destined to be deceptive and fragile.
A dialogue with political Islam, in the form of Hamas, for instance, is an unavoidable necessity. Ostracism and banning is a recipe for disaster, as the example of Algeria shows. Creating a space for legitimate political activity by Islamic parties, including recognition of their right to govern, is the way to encourage moderation. The challenge therefore is not to destroy the only Islamic movements that can claim authentic popular support in the Arab world, but rather to solidify their fragile transition from radical jihad to the politics of compromise.
Reprinted from Ha’aretz, April 21, 2007
