The current crisis and its attendant dangers present a
chance to reshape regional realities. The aim of the war
should not be proving the justness of our cause — that’s
clear to all — but to improve our national security and
statecraft. We must accept that a terrorist group cannot
be routed and disarmed through military means alone,
and certainly not through a protracted retaking of territory.
War is a crucial stage, but ultimately our goals will
be achieved through diplomacy.
The Lebanese government must be persuaded to move against Hezbollah, with the help of
the international community. This is the only way to secure calm for our northern border in
the long run.
Today’s Lebanon, contrary to that of the 1980s, has a substantial majority that seeks national
independence and democratic stability. This majority, which is made up of Sunnis,
Christians and Druze, as well as some of the Shi’ite community, mounted an impressive
popular campaign that ousted Syria’s forces from Lebanon and undercut Syrian sway over
Lebanese politics. Then there are the moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt,
as well as the wider international community, that are interested in regional stability and
in undermining Iranian influence. In other words, our interests coincide with those of most
of the region’s main players. This allows us to create a new diplomatic reality. It is also the
reason that Israel is being allowed time to press its military offensive.
But getting the Beirut government to move against Hezbollah is no easy matter. Hezbollah
combines an Iraniana-Shi’ite outlook with Lebanese nationalism. It is not just Iran’s proxy
in Lebanon, rather a national Lebanese force. Hezbollah’s legitimacy is only bolstered by
the assaults on Lebanese sovereignty. So a delicate balance is required from Israel, in which
it hits Hezbollah hard while doing its utmost not to create a humanitarian disaster in Lebanon
that would harm the country’s sense of sovereignty.
This balance will be compromised by our insertion of large ground forces to fight in southern
Lebanon, because in the eyes of the Lebanese, and many others in the Arab world, we
have returned as occupiers. Continued fighting in the current format risks restoring Hezbollah’s
legitimacy as guardians of Lebanon and its sovereignty, and as the vanguard of the
struggle against Western aggression. We are single-handedly entrapping the Lebanese government.
If it tried to move against Hezbollah against these conditions, it would be accused
of collaborating with the Israeli invader.
To empower the Lebanese government, as well as the international community seeking Hezbollah’s
disarmament, we must weigh carefully how much military force to use and which
diplomatic initiatives to pursue.
Militarily, we should rely on air power and avoid face-to-face combat as much as possible,
as the terrain massively favors the defenders. With that said, having engaged in ground
fighting we should not hesitate to bring in major firepower and armor in order to reduce our
casualties and the time spent on Lebanese territory.
From a diplomatic standpoint, weakening Hezbollah means empowering the Lebanese majority
that favors independence and democratic rule. This requires a clear diplomatic horizon
in Lebanon, based on the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559.
An accord with the Lebanese government should therefore be based on the following key
principles:
* The Lebanese army redeploys to the south of the country immediately upon the Israeli
Defence Forces’ withdrawal.
* If foreign peacekeepers are required, they should be requested by the Lebanese government.
Peacekeepers should include units from moderate Arab countries, to lend their
mandate legitimacy in the eyes of Lebanese who might otherwise perceive them as a tool of
occupation by Western superpowers.
* Hezbollah is disarmed, remaining a political party only.
* A timetable is set for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sheeba Farms and for the border to
be redrawn under U.N. auspices, in coordination with Syria and Lebanon.
* Our abducted soldiers are freed in return for the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israel.
The next stage would be to pave out future contacts between Israel and Lebanon on matters
such as water sources, bilateral relations, terms for foreign forces to leave the region, and
international aid for the Lebanese.
As long as the diplomatic framework is not drawn up and endorsed by the international
community, as long as the hostages are not transferred to the custody of the Lebanese government,
we must continue waging this war. But we must not set up an Israeli buffer zone in
southern Lebanon. Nor should we repeat the mistake of the Tannenbaum deal by releasing
Palestinian prisoners within the framework of negotiations with Lebanon. In any negotiations
with the Lebanese government only Lebanese prisoners should be released. Handing
over Palestinian prisoners to the Hizbollah would give that organization unnecessary prestige
and crown Nasralah as the leader of the Palestinian cause.
Most importantly, we should remember that Iran is the real existential threat for Israel, and
that whatever may unfold in Lebanon, it must not be allowed to harm the struggle by Israel
and the international community against Iranian threat.
With well-considered military and diplomatic moves, we can reshape the reality on our
northern border. To succeed in the mission, we must recognize the fact that military moves
must be complemented – and completed – by diplomacy. This is the real test for the Olmert-
Peretz government.
