While a number of American Jewish organizations, including AIPAC, and some Israelis on the center-left, endorsed Bush’s new Palestinian-Israeli peace formula—bolster the Fatah West Bank government while isolating Hamas in Gaza—a wide array of Middle East observers in the U.S. and in Israel expressed deep skepticism that the Bush initiative had any chance of success.
1. Doubts about the viability of Bush’s plan held by the U.S. intelligence community were leaked to the media the day before the speech. (U.S. Bet on Abbas For Mideast Peace Meets Skepticism; Intelligence Reports Cast Doubt on Strength While Warning of Tenacity of Rival Hamas, Robin Wright, Washington Post, July 16, 2007):
Several intelligence assessments have warned that Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, the man U.S. policymakers hope can help salvage the Middle East peace process, may not be politically strong enough to achieve that goal, according to U.S. officials. The assessments have also cautioned that his opponents in Hamas — the Islamic movement that is being shunned by Abbas, Israel and the United States — will not be easily marginalized.
The White House is now betting that Abbas, replenished by the return of aid from the West and tax revenue withheld by Israel, can create a stable enclave in the West Bank and resume peace negotiations with Israel, a view reiterated yesterday by national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley. He said on ABC’s “This Week” that President Bush today will publicly discuss “what we are going to do to support [Abbas] . . . financially, diplomatically.” The administration intends to continue politically isolating the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. Abbas dismissed the Hamas government, which was democratically elected and has refused to recognize Israel, after it routed his security forces in Gaza.
The “West Bank first” strategy is the White House’s biggest and potentially riskiest policy departure in its dealings with the Palestinian Authority since it was created in 1994. The administration is moving into uncharted territory in trying to aid Abbas even though he and his Fatah political party control just a portion of the Authority.
…Abbas faces a difficult challenge in limiting [Hamas’] political presence, especially in Hebron and Nablus, according to officials who described the intelligence assessments…The Palestinian president does not control all armed groups, including the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, that are linked to Fatah, and he may not be able to stem all terrorist plots, the intelligence reports have also warned. Hamas members and other extremists have significant incentive to target Israel from the West Bank to undermine new peace efforts — and Abbas’s ability to build a Hamas-less state, the assessments suggest.
Intelligence officials have cautioned that Hamas, cut off in Gaza from the outside world under a strategy supported by Israel and the Bush administration, could even enhance its position among Palestinians. The assessments warn that many may blame Israel or outsiders for their plight, which the World Bank warned in a report last week could lead to irreversible economic damage.
U.S. intelligence has warned that Abbas will have difficulty following through on what he has promised for the past 18 months and what most Palestinians want from him domestically: to clean house and rebuild Fatah with a younger generation of politicians. Broad reform — by the Fatah-dominated emergency government or within Fatah itself — is unlikely to happen anytime soon, analysts have warned….Despite Hamas’s money problems, the intelligence assessments note that the party intends to be taken seriously and is trying to institute smoother local rule in Gaza.
“On the one hand, a West Bank-first strategy is a commendable effort to make lemonade out of lemons. But it also seems to be an extension of the mistaken belief that sufficient efforts to isolate and pressure Hamas will make Hamas go away. Hamas will not go away,” said Paul Pillar, a former chief Middle East analyst on the National Intelligence Council. “Hamastan in Gaza has tremendous potential to rebound to everyone’s disadvantage — not just to the Palestinians’, but also the Israelis’.”
Bruce Riedel, a recently retired CIA Middle East analyst now at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center…and Pillar both said they believe that the Bush administration is not listening closely to the intelligence community on the Palestinian crisis….Abbas is also likely to be conflicted about the impact of isolating Gaza indefinitely, the assessments warn. “It will be very hard for him to turn his back on the plight of 1.2 million Palestinians in Gaza,” Riedel added. “He may be angry at Hamas today, but he will not be in a position to tolerate a policy that punishes 1.2 million people, and as a political leader, he can’t afford to do it.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/15/AR2007071501184_pf.html
2. Haim Malka, fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said there was little new in Mr. Bush’s speech and questioned what could be achieved without the involvement of Hamas. ‘It’s important that the US engages in diplomacy,’ he said. ‘But this seems like the repackaging of an old policy. What the administration needs is a new strategy not a new conference.’
“The administration has realised there is a cost attached to neglecting this issue,’ said Tamara Wittes, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think-tank. In particular, the US needed to demonstrate commitment to the peace process in return for help from Arab countries in stabilising Iraq, she added. ‘The US needs something that looks and feels and smells like a peace process whether or not it has any chance of reaching a final settlement.’ For Mr Bush, his attempt to revive the peace process represents a broader shift in US foreign policy towards soft power and diplomacy after nearly six draining years of war. But, with the president weakened by the chaos in Iraq and the Palestinian territories divided, few analysts expect significant progress during his final 18 months in office.
Mr Bush is not the first occupant of the White House to turn his attention to the Palestinian problem in the closing stages of his presidency. Bill Clinton also intensified efforts to find a settlement during his final months in office.
Philip Gordon, another senior fellow at Brookings, says Mr Bush’s last-ditch diplomacy holds much less promise than his predecessor’s did. “Clinton genuinely thought he could pull it off because all the pieces seemed to be in place. There is much less optimism this time round,” he says. “Bush is doing it more to avoid being accused of not doing anything.” (Bush Returns Palestinian Peace To Agenda, Andrew Ward, Financial Times, July 19, 2007 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/eddcbc9c-3596-11dc-bb16-0000779fd2ac.html )
3. Israeli columnist Nahum Barnea: Bush–Full of good intentions, but lacking any significance. Barnea wrote in Ynet that “The words that five years ago were perceived as a show of strength sounded as hollow as a church sermon on Monday: Full of good intentions, but lacking any significance. All Bush is promising to do is to convene a regional conference in the fall headed by Condoleezza Rice. These meetings are nothing more than castles in the air.” (“American president’s address Monday a theatrical farewell gesture, Ynet, July 17, 2007)
http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3426391,00.html
4. Daniel Levy writes at Prospects for Peace that “Driving home Palestinian division is simply not a policy that can deliver. First of all, it stacks the odds against the security and stability that are crucial to any peace process. Secondly, even if negotiations begin, and even if a deal is reached, between Israel and the Abbas/Fayyad government, that deal will be tough and difficult for both sides to market. And doing so, in the context of deep Palestinian division, almost guarantees that such a deal will lack the legitimacy to make it sustainable. Interestingly some Arab states, EU foreign ministers, and the UN Secretary General have all seemed to recognize as much in their own statements. UN SG Ban Ki Moon was quoted by the BBC last week in a TV interview as supporting a return to Palestinian unity talks. The Egyptians and Saudis, and the Arab League, have been putting out feelers towards eventually reconvening an internal Palestinian dialogue. All ten EU foreign ministers of the Mediterranean area, meeting last week in Slovenia, sent a letter to new Envoy Tony Blair that included the following call:
Don’t push Hamas to up the stakes. This means reopening the border between Gaza and Egypt, facilitating movement between Gaza and Israel, and encouraging Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as President Mubarak has proposed, to help get the resumption of the dialogue between Hamas and Fatah.” (Abbas, Olmert Meet: Hamas, Fatah Trade Barbs, Daniel Levy, Prospects for Peace blog, July 16, 2007)
http://www.prospectsforpeace.com/2007/07/abbas_olmert_meet_hamas_fatah_1.html )
5. Former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy is among those who hold that the Bush strategy is doomed to fail, necessitating a Plan B that is predicated on Israel opening up direct contacts with Hamas on security and a range of pragmatic issues. Other observers don’t go that far, suggesting instead that the Bush strategy, which will foment continued conflict and civil war between Fatah and Hamas, should yield to a more realistic approach. The new realism accepts the inevitability and even desirability of a Fatah-Hamas unity government, and the improbability that Fatah under Abbas’ leadership can deliver on security and a peace accord. At the same time, it encourages Israel and the US to negotiate a long-term armistice and major West Bank territorial withdrawal with President Abbas and the PLO, but with the acquiescence of Hamas.
Halevy, a Sharon appointee to the Mossad directorship, wrote: “Whereas Mubarak initially condemned the Hamas takeover, naming it a military coup directed against Abbas, he clearly changed his tune a day after the summit and said he would be sending back his military mission to Gaza the moment things cooled down. He even hinted that there might still be room for reconciliation between the rival Palestinian factions. Similar sentiments were echoed by Qatar (the Arab states’ representative on the U.N. Security Council), Russia, and others.”
Halevy wondered: “What timetable can Abbas offer for establishing complete and effective control of the West Bank? When and how can he restore authority in Gaza? Can he negotiate a political settlement with Israel ignoring Gaza? How many real divisions does he have here and now? How many will he have in six months’ time? And if, as he said this weekend, he will hold new general elections isolating and banning Hamas from participation, what credibility will the results have in the eyes of the public? Can he hold credible elections in the West Bank alone if, as is clear, he cannot restore any vestige of his authority in the Gaza Strip. His call this weekend, in Paris, for the dispatch of an international force to take over control of Gaza and to facilitate the participation of the Gazans in the planned elections is testimony to the world of fantasy in which he is now functioning. Nobody will send troops into Gaza to uproot Hamas, and Abbas must surely know this because his French hosts made this clear to him.”
“Does the United States believe that it can overturn both the election results that gave Hamas a parliamentary majority and the Hamas military takeover of the Strip?… In the best of scenarios as envisaged in Jerusalem, Washington, and Ramallah, further deterioration of political conditions in the Strip may lead to the disappearance of the last vestiges of any Hamas central authority. But this would not bring Fatah back to Gaza; rather lawlessness could deteriorate into chaos and this would be worse than a centralized Hamas administration. In either circumstance it is doubtful that Abbas will be in any position to negotiate anything at all with Israel. Will the West Bankers go ahead and make a separate deal? What real value will it have? Can Abbas sell a solution to the Palestinian issue crafted on the support of American and Israeli bayonets? I doubt it. This is hardly a viable strategy to promote.”
“Therefore, in the likely event that the joint Israeli-American plan worked out in Egypt to support Abbas and isolate Hamas fails, it will be necessary to move to Plan B. This plan is predicated first and foremost on accepting realities on the ground and turning them to the best possible advantage. Hamas has demonstrated that when in distress, it is pliable to practical arrangements on the ground. Therefore, parallel to maintaining pressure on Hamas on a daily basis, isolating it regionally and internationally, contacts should be established with Hamas to see if a long-term armistice with it can be obtained.
It must be a tough eyeball-to-eyeball exercise in which Hamas is brought to a point where its self-interest dictates such an understanding. An armistice will entail provisions for maintaining security, ending arms smuggling into the Strip, et cetera. Until this is achieved, constant military pressure must be maintained. In scope, this could resemble the original armistice agreements negotiated and agreed to by Israel and the Arab states after the War of Independence in 1948-1949. At that time, too, the Arab states refused to recognize Israel–just as does Hamas today–but they nevertheless signed binding agreements with it. Armistice would not be a political determination of the conflict but a down-to-earth method of reducing tensions–a goal most essential, inter alia to American interests in the Middle East at large.” (The New Republic, July 4, 2007)
6. The Associated Press reports (“White House Downplays Mideast Meeting,” July 17, 2007) that “A retired Israeli general proposed that Israel quietly open a ‘channel’ to Hamas.” ‘We have to start a dialogue to move forward,’ Israela Oron, who retired 10 years ago, told reporters on a private trip to Washington. She said Hamas should not have to recognize Israel as a precondition for talks, but the group, designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Israel and European allies, would have to accept past accords reached by the Palestinians with Israel. ‘Hamas represents at least half the Palestinian people,’ she said…’The Palestinian people are normal people. They want to live in peace and quiet,’” she added.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070717/ap_on_go_pr_wh/us_mideast
7. A new poll conducted during mid-July 2007 by the New Wave Research Institute (“HaGal HaHadash”) found that the Israeli public supports international involvement in the peace process, permanent status negotiations with President Abbas and dialogue with Hamas. Most Israelis–66%–according to the poll, want permanent status negotiations with Abbas (vs. 32% who oppose), while at the same time 57% favor (vs. 36% who oppose) Israel holding direct talks with Hamas on pragmatic issues: “securing a ceasefire, preventing a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, resolving the issue of crossings, creating basic economic conditions, and securing the release of Gilad Shalit.”
http://www.geneva-accord.org/General.aspx?docID=2142&FolderID=45&lang=en
8. Former peace negotiator Dennis Ross writes in The New Republic that “It may be fashionable among some in Washington or even Tel Aviv to believe that it is time to talk to Hamas. But to the members of Fatah and the Palestinian independents in the West Bank with whom I have been meeting, it surely is not. What you hear from them is that Hamas is made up of killers; that they want to be part of a larger Islamist empire; that they are already trying to bring Iran to Gaza; and that the worse thing to do now is to reward Hamas with recognition.”
“For that reason, you also hear criticism of the Saudis who are pressing Mahmoud Abbas to reconcile with Hamas and forge a new national unity government. Indeed, I was struck by the almost unanimous sentiment that the reconciliation talks which both the Saudis and Egyptians are pushing–and Hamas leaders like Ismail Haniyeh favor–will not change Hamas’s behavior. Instead, the story goes, Hamas will use them as a tactic to try to build its international acceptability. Worse, it would use a new national unity government to try to do in the West Bank what it has now done in Gaza.” (Dennis Ross, Can Fatah Compete With Hamas?, The New Republic, July 16, 2007 http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w071607&s=ross071607 )
9. Former Israeli Deputy Defense Minister and current Labor Knesset Member Ephraim Sneh endorsed the new Bush-Olmert strategy, writing in “How To Stop Hamas” (Ha’aretz, July 17, 2007) that “The most urgent and important mission for Israel at this time is preventing a Hamas takeover of the West Bank. It is possible to do this by weakening Hamas through visible diplomatic progress; helping the effective and successful functioning of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayad’s government; and the creation of conditions for the total failure of the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip.”
However, Sneh introduces a novel twist, not currently accepted by Olmert or Bush: “It is necessary to release a large number of Fatah prisoners, headed by Marwan Barghouti. The number of Israeli victims who will be spared by his exit to political activity outside of prison is many times greater than the number of those for whose deaths he was convicted. Of the 11,000 prisoners who are held by Israel, 6,000 are Fatah people. The political benefit in freeing many of them is immeasurably greater than the security risk entailed in doing so.”
10. Mark Helprin, writing in the New York Times, maintains that the “structural imperatives” of the region have become so aligned—much as they were when Egypt and Israel struck a deal 30 years ago—that a significant probability exists for the Palestinians and Israel to make peace. “The effect of the [Iraq] war has been to shatter the politics of the region and create opportunities, one of which is the potential for a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians….Hamas, too, has overplayed its hand, which has provided the opening from which a Palestinian-Israeli peace may emerge. For the first time since 1948, a fundamental division among the Palestinians presents a condition in which the less absolutist view may find shelter and take hold.
“Mahmoud Abbas, the Fatah leader and Palestinian president, is weak in many ways, but he has decisively isolated the radicals. …In economically besieged Gaza, Hamas is corralled by Israel, Egypt and the sea, its apparent strength exaggerated by Mr. Abbas’s decision not to fight on this battlefield but rather to profit by its loss, much as did King Hussein in regard to the West Bank in 1967. The starving and oppressed Gazans who watch Hamas fire rockets, the chief effect of which is to summon Israeli tanks, may soon see a prosperous West Bank at the brink of statehood and at peace with its neighbors and the world….And although Hamas leaders portray Mr. Abbas as a collaborator, it is they who may be held to account for keeping more than a million of their own people hostage to a gratuitous preference for struggle over success.
“The sudden and intense commonality of interest between the Palestinian Authority and Israel is the equivalent of the Israeli-Egyptian core of 1977. But today, the Arabs, in the second circle, have largely reversed position. Fearful of Iran’s sponsorship of war, chaos and revolution, they will apply their weight against the rejectionists. We are now…on the verge of a rare alignment of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the leading Arab nations and the major powers. If Israel and the Palestinian Authority can pursue a strategy of limited aims, concentrating on bilateral agreements rather than a single work of fallible grandeur, they may accomplish something on the scale of Sadat’s extraordinary démarche of 30 years ago. The odds are perhaps the best they have been since, and responsible governments should recognize them as the spur for appropriate action and risk.”
(Mark Helprin, Forced to Get Along, New York Times, July 19, 2007)
11. New Bush Financial Aid For Palestinians Called A Mirage: But potentialities and possibilities do not reality make. Helprin’s structural inclinations and forces could well be left unrealized. Much depends on execution, and there are far too many reasons to doubt that the Bush Administration, the Olmert government, and Abbas, Fayyad and Fatah, will execute wisely, robustly or effectively enough for the potentialities to be fulfilled. Among the many reasons for believing so is the fact that the new financial aid package announced by President Bush in his speech to strengthen Abbas turns out to be a mirage. Nathan Guttman reports:
“President Bush trumpeted a new aid package for the Palestinians on Monday, but congressional sources and aid groups say that Bush’s proposal is actually just a shifting around of existing funds that will provide almost no new help on the ground. In a broad-ranging speech Monday about the Palestinian situation, Bush promised to provide the Palestinians with $190 million in aid and $80 million in security assistance.
“The aid package is part of a general push by the Bush administration to support the Palestinian Authority after Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas pushed Hamas out of the government. Bush spoke about “strengthening our financial commitment,” but people involved with the process say that nearly all the aid money announced by Bush was scheduled to go to the Palestinians at the beginning of this year.”
New Aid For Palestinians Called A Mirage, Nathan Guttman, Forward, July 18, 2007
http://www.forward.com/articles/11193/
