This was a week that buoyed hopes for Arab-Israeli peace. The leaders of 21 Arab states, meeting in Ryadh, Saudi Arabia under the auspices of the Arab League, reaffirmed their 2002 offer of comprehensive peace with Israel. Originally called the Arab Peace Initiative (also known as the Beirut Declaration), inspired by a Saudi proposal, its meaning has been hotly contested from the moment the plan was first unveiled.
According to the official translation of the newly revived Arab peace offer, the Arab states commit to “the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel…ending the Arab-Israel conflict.” It is often forgotten that the 2002 Arab peace initiative effectively rescinds the infamous “three noes of Khartoum”—no recognition, no negotiations, no peace with Israel—issued by the Arab League in 1967 after the Six Day War. In exchange for establishing full peace, Israel is expected to agree to:
1. A “full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967…”
2. “A just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.”
3. “The establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 4, 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.”
Do the Arabs Support Negotiations with Israel?
The first myth that arose about the Arab peace initiative was that it was a take-it-or leave it offer which the Arab states refuse to negotiate. In fact, while Arab leaders are publicly calling on Israel to accept the initiative in its current form, they are calling for direct negotiations on the basis of the Arab proposal: the foreign ministers of 10 Arab states will meet in Cairo in two weeks and “will call on the government of Israel and on all Israelis to accept the Arab peace initiative and use the existing opportunity to renew direct negotiations,” Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa recently said. Saudi Arabia announced “that it was now Israel’s responsibility to undertake steps that would enable progress in contacts with Arab states.”
Nearly half the Israeli public agreed that the plan could constitute a basis for negotiations on a comprehensive peace accord, while the same number disagreed, according to a public opinion survey from March 26-27 by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Studies at Tel Aviv University. At the same time, an overwhelming majority, 72%, “think the Olmert government currently lacks sufficient public support to enter negotiations on a comprehensive” peace deal.
On the Palestinian side, a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (March 22-24), found that “A majority of 72% supports the Saudi, or Arab, initiative and 26% oppose it. 63% support and 35% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and resolution of all issues of conflict.” The same poll also found that “A majority of 71% support and 27% oppose the conduct of negotiations with Israel that would aim at establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank, to be followed by negotiations between the Palestinian state and Israel on a permanent settlement.” And finally, “a majority of 85% supports the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip” and “84% support the extension of the current ceasefire to include the West Bank.”
Palestinian opinions about Hamas were also telling. 47% believe that “Hamas’ goal is to reach a long term Hudna or truce with Israel,” and another 22% believe “its aim is to seek a permanent peace with Israel.” 24% believe “its goal is to insure the continuation of the conflict.”
Secret Saudi-Israeli Talks on the Refugees
The second myth surrounding the Arab peace initiative often surfaced in the tendentious and careless language used in press reports in newspapers throughout the political spectrum. Ha’aretz was among the notable exceptions for the accuracy of its depiction of the Arab offer, but even it was not consistent. While many reporters and editorialists throughout the world—including some at Ha’aretz—claimed that the Arab offer required Israel to accept the right of return (or simply the return) of Palestinian refugees to their former homes in Israel, others, like Ha’aretz’s Aluf Benn, were more careful, referring instead to the declaration’s “clause on refugees, which the Palestinians interpret as a right of return.”
Readers of the “Daily Alert” news digest published on behalf of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations by Dore Gold’s hardline rightist Jerusalem think tank were treated to an op-ed by Michael Medved claiming that “The latest Arab League peace proposal, recycled with much fanfare from a 2002 Saudi plan, includes a requirement that Israel should accept untold millions of Palestinians who would relocate into Israel itself, rather than making their homes in the newly created Palestinian State.”
It came as a shock to some who had not read the official translation that the Arab League declaration in fact contained no explicit reference to a “right of return” for Palestinian refugees. The omission was significant. Moreover, those who insisted that the Arab League plan required Israel to allow “millions” of Palestinian refugees into Israel managed to overlook the declaration’s careful language on the refugees which called for a mutually “agreed” solution to the refugee problem. Since accepting such numbers of refugees—or even any refugees—would be contrary to what the current Israeli leadership (both Olmert and Livni) would countenance, it would not satisfy the Arab League requirement that the solution be “agreed” to by all parties.
Even more important than what happens in the public eye, or in official statements, is the behind-the-scenes diplomacy where much of the real work of negotiations is done. Ynet, the English-language internet edition of Israel’s largest circulation daily newspaper Yediot Aharonot, reported on March 28 that “Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel have recently held secret talks to formulate a new diplomatic-financial initiative aimed at resolving the Palestinian refugee problem, by offering compensation to those willing to stay in their countries of residence…According to the new initiative, refugees who agreed to remain in their countries of residence would receive financial compensation. Those who insisted on realizing the right of return would only be allowed to return to the Palestinian territories. Their return would be coordinated with the Palestinian Authority, in order to prevent a flood of refugees, and severe economic problems…”
“At the same time, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the US would finance projects to improve the refugees’ quality of life and create more jobs for them. The ambitious plan requires billions of dollars in funding.” The report states that “the negotiations were led by senior American officials, and included Saudi secretary-general of the National Security Council, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, and top Israeli officials.” (“Compensation plan for Palestinian refugees promoted”)
A 2003 poll of Palestinian refugees found that only 10% would choose to exercise an option to return to Israel—still a far larger number than Israeli leaders or the Israeli public would likely accept. But few consider that choices between options can be influenced by the way options are weighted: when refugees answered the survey question they were not offered the kind of comprehensive rehabilitation and compensation program that the Saudis have now broached. Moreover, without a robust international economic development program—a Marshall Plan—for a new Palestinian state, it is hardly surprising that some preferred relocation to affluent Israel than to a nascent impoverished and undeveloped Palestinian polity, or remaining in the poor Arab countries in which they currently reside.
The Refugees: Mired in Myth
Nor is it clear that UN General Assembly Resolution 194 supports the interpretation favored by some Palestinians, and feared by many in Israel and the American Jewish community. “While it is understandable that the Israeli government is cautious about accepting an initiative that would use UN Resolution 194 as a basis for negotiations on refugees, Israeli concerns are vastly out of proportion to any real problem that 194 represents,” writes political scientist Jerome M. Segal in Ynet (“UN Resolution 194 does not grant refugees explicit right to come back,” March 22, 2007) Segal notes that there is no explicit reference to any “right of return” in the UN resolution. Further, while “Palestinians assume that it must be taken to apply to all descendants of the 1948 refugees, there is no explicit statement of that sort. Indeed, since it was envisioned that action on the refugees would be taken promptly, there was no intended reference, one way or the other, to third and forth generations of the 1948 refugees over a half century later.”
The resolution speaks of a return that would occur at the “earliest practicable date” and when mentioning return, it “speaks of a ‘return to their homes.’” But, Segal goes on, “the resolution is silent about return to anyplace else, whether to lands near their homes, or more generally, to lands within the 1949 Armistice lines. Moreover, given that in almost all cases the refugees’ homes no longer exist or have become the homes of successive generations of Israelis, a return to homes is not practicable at all. In short, the return provision is completely empty; only compensation is relevant.”
Finally, Segal concludes: “The resolution also provides a vital limitation. It never speaks of the 1948 refugees as a group. Rather it speaks of ‘the refugees wishing to . . . live at peace with their neighbors.’ Thus, it proposes a criterion of applicability. The criterion is there because Israel cannot be expected to accept large numbers of refugees who would be a security threat. But under current circumstances, what is the meaningful application of this provision? Clearly, it cannot be understood as providing for unlimited numbers of returning descendents. On any interpretation, several million returning refugees would transform the security situation. But further, the security issue has to be grasped within the context of foreseeable possible political scenarios. It is one thing to live in peace with one’s neighbors when there is permanent peace with the Palestinian state and the Arab world. But what if at some future point the peace breaks down? How is Israel to know which refugees would be at peace within a context of war?”
Since “there will never be agreement on what Resolution 194 requires,” there will instead “be a specific treaty that solves the refugee issue and an agreement ‘that this satisfies 194.’ If accepting 194 as a basis for negotiations can help get us to that point, it will have played a valuable role. In short, a declaration, like the Arab League peace plan, which calls for a just and agreed solution to the refugee problem “in accordance” with UN Resolution 194, does not require Israel to accept millions—or even any—refugees into its sovereign territory.
To be sure, some Palestinians will reject any solution which does not allow for the repatriation of refugees to Israel. But the Saudis, and other Arab leaders, have introduced language on the refugees that can be interpreted to satisfy many parties, leaving the real solution to the hard work of negotiations. The Saudis and other Arab leaders have also reportedly lent their diplomatic and economic heft to devising a solution that could be acceptable to Israel. Dismissing the Arab peace initiative due to its reference to UN Resolution 194, or refusing to enter into serious negotiations with the Arab initiative as a basis, is both short-sighted and foolhardy.
Prime Minister Olmert’s Response, Labor’s Critique
Prime Minister Olmert offered various encouraging statements in response to the Arab peace initiative, referring to “its positive elements” while expressing reservations about its language on the refugees. He praised Saudi King Abdullah for his role in initiating the declaration, and called on moderate Arab leaders to join him in a regional peace conference. He told Ha’aretz of his belief that “in the next five years” it will be “possible to arrive at a comprehensive peace agreement with the Arab states and the Palestinians.”
Several leaders of the Labor Party expressed concern that the Prime Minister’s welcome words would not be followed up with the kind of substantive response to the Arab peace initiative which is required to seize the opportunity available to Israel. Deputy Defense Minister and Labor MK Ephraim Sneh told Israel Army Radio (Galei Tzahal on April 1): “I am critical of the fact that we are, in fact, missing an opportunity of good will. Today, (German) Chancellor Merkel is visiting here. The American Secretary of State was here a week ago. There is immense international effort and good will to promote an agreement between us and the Palestinians. Good will is also coming from the Arab world, including from those who were not previously of that opinion.
“If it ends with the fact that once every two weeks, there will be some kind of meeting whose purpose is unclear, between the Prime Minister and Abu Mazen – then that is not enough. The danger is that the disappointment from these meetings will bring about more despair, which will bring about further escalation.
Sneh’s interviewer challenged him: “Listen. You heard and probably saw the interviews that the Prime Minister gave, both to the press and on the TV. He also gave interviews to the American press. What he said includes more than a rejection of the initiative. First of all, he said that the initiative is interesting. Secondly, he said that Saudi Arabia is playing a very important role. Third, the headline of his interview in the American ‘Time’ magazine, I believe, was ‘Listen, if the king of Saudi Arabia meets with me, he will hear something very surprising from me’. Does that not satisfy you?”
Sneh replied: “Not at all. First of all, you have to remember that Saudi Arabia is a very important country, but they are not the ones with whom we have a 100-year conflict. We have a 100-year conflict with the Palestinians. If there is a Palestinian leader who is prepared to sit down and talk with us about how we can solve it, he is the one we should sit with. And if there are surprises, he should be the one we surprise.”
Q: “Israel however, is continuing to adhere to the conditions of the Quartet. I assume that you accept these preliminary conditions – a cessation of terror, recognition of the State of Israel and acknowledgement of international agreements. In that respect, you support the view that Israel should not meet with Hamas ministers.”
Sneh responded: “The conditions of the Quartet do not talk about the cessation of terror. They talk about the fact that the Palestinian government should condemn terror and wash its hand of it.”
Q: “And fight it.”
Sneh continued: “Therefore, I think that we have no way to proceed with this unity government. However, we cannot ignore the fact that Palestinian society is divided. It is divided across a great rift. We should start talking with whoever is on the side of the rift that believes in co-existence with the State of Israel. I am not saying we will implement an agreement tomorrow morning. But to start talking about the principles of the permanent accord – believe me Razi – that is work for at least half a year. At the very least.”
Defense Minster and Labor Party leader Amir Peretz stressed that Israel should “not be satisfied with the fact that the Arab consensus adopted formulas for ending the conflict with Israel.” Peretz is convinced that Israel needs to launch its own diplomatic initiative in order to discuss the principles for a permanent agreement with Palestinian President Abbas, reported Ynet (March 30, 2007). He believes that “such an initiative should be carried out in cooperation with the Quartet and representatives of the Arab League states.” “The Arab initiative is a basis for discussing the permanent agreement,” said Peretz. He added that “we must view any Palestinian who clearly accepts the Saudi initiative as one who has taken an important step toward a dialogue with Israel.”
