The upcoming Annapolis peace raises a pressing question: Should Israel now be negotiating over the principles of a final peace accord?
My answer is unequivocal: Israel cannot and must not avoid dealing with the core issues of the conflict. Agreement on the principles of an accord would not mean we have given in to the other side, but rather, that we have looked out for Israel’s basic interests. An internationally recognized document that sets out Israel’s terms and red lines in the matters of borders, Jerusalem and refugees is the only means of ensuring Israel remains a secure and democratic Jewish homeland.
By evading these issues over the years, we have warped the international agenda. By insisting on “not showing our cards to soon” we fell into the trap we were trying to set for our foes. Thus, for example, we put up the West Bank security fence without making clear what the future holds for those settlers who find themselves on its eastern side. They became de-facto hostages of those who forever oppose any peace deal. Such policymaking calls the government’s moral authority into question.
The current situation offers Israel a one-time but transient opportunity to achieve the best possible peace accord, one that will also address regional concerns. U.S. support is at its zenith, the Arab world in general – in jitters over the threats posed by Iran and radical Islam – wants to see an end to the conflict with Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, for all its weakness, has leaders who are not afraid to declare their commitment to peace with us.
By prudently exploiting this rare opportunity, we can win Arab and international recognition for our national rights, including the extension of Israeli sovereignty to the blocs in which most West Bank settlers live, including the neighborhoods around Jerusalem. There is no guarantee that such a chance will arise again.
It is no surprise that Hamas, Iran and Hezbollah want the conference to fail and progress toward a final peace accord stymied. Our enemies know well that reconciliation and prosperity will seriously compromise their ability to enflame the conflict.
Among us there is also a minority that refuses under any circumstances to pay the price of compromise and will reject any accord. This minority is bolstered, ironically, by those who in principle want an accord but believe that the time is not right to talk about the terms. Their main argument is that there is no point in discussing a permanent accord because the Palestinian side is too weak to hold up its end, that Israel will be giving up its precious assets for nothing while the Palestinians go back to undermining its, bit by bit. Such misbegotten thinking harms Israel’s long-term interests.
It is in the absence of a binding set of principles that we have found ourselves, over the years, retreating from our negotiating positions and yielding to pressure, and this without ever seriously broaching the idea of peace. Instead of taking the initiative by bravely working toward our own defined goals in the matters of refugees, Jerusalem and borders; we have been thrashing about without a compass.
Non-discussion of the principles of a final peace accord is not a function of Palestinian weakness, but a recipe for its perpetuation. After all, that which we describe as a “diplomatic horizon” is a key element in the strategy for shoring up those Palestinians who are ready for compromise and reconciliation with us. It seeks credibility for the “road map” and for the Palestinian leadership to expand its public support by showing that it makes diplomatic gains, gains that would give it further incentives to fulfill its side of the bargain.
Clarifying the diplomatic horizon prevents the Palestinians from shirking their responsibilities. It would also strengthen Israel in its demand that every clause of every stage in the deal be implemented before the sides move on. In other words, the accord would be implemented gradually and in full reciprocity.
Israel needs the peace conference to succeed. Failure would stoke regional instability, those that refuse to recognize Israel would grow in power strength and influence, Hamas could take over the West Bank, and U.S. prestige in the Middle East would suffer another blow.
It is important to draw a distinction between willingness to hold talks on a document of principles, and the significance of the positions we must take regarding the core issues of the conflict. My belief is that Israel’s need and willingness to enter such a discussion does not in any way clash with our obligation to uphold our principles and lay down our red lines.
But the decision to enter negotiations, once made, should not mean they be conducted rashly. If we need more time to reach agreement, it would be wise to postpone the conference by a few weeks in order to arrive ready, with a creditable accord in hand.
This is the time for Israel to fly its flag — not fold it.
Ami Ayalon MK is a Minister without Portfolio in the current government and a former head of Israel’s Navy and Israel’s Internal Security Service.
Published in Revival, the English News Magazine of Israel’s Labor Party, Oct. 2007, Volume 4, Issue 1
